A Canadian CH-146 Griffon flies over the Red Desert near Kandahar on a training mission. Graham Lavery Photo.
This story appears in “Canadian Combat Helicopters in Afghanistan,” a special supplement to the Dec’10-Jan’11 Vertical. To read the entire supplement, sign in at www.www.verticalmag.com/digital
With the purchase and subsequent deployment to Afghanistan of the CH-147D Chinook in 2008, it was apparent there would need to be an escort platform to accompany it – and that would be the CH-146 Griffon, the Canadian military’s variant of the venerable Bell 412. With few other options available to the Canadian Air Force, it set about making a square peg fit into a round hole; not an easy task when that hole is one of the more challenging flying environments on Earth.
The story of the Griffon in Kandahar could be told solely from the perspective of the struggle to effectively operate a machine – that by any measure is not designed for extreme hot, high and heavy conditions – in the demanding and difficult southern Afghan theatre. To do so, however, would be to ignore “the rest of the story”: a story that has served to highlight the versatility of the platform, manufacturer and engine supplier; and the ingenuity, flexibility and determination of the Canadian Forces personnel who have made it work. Amid much initial doubt and consternation, the success of the Griffon has most certainly proven the critics wrong.
The Platform
The Griffons operating out of Kandahar Airfield (KAF) have been modified extensively from the standard CH-146s many have witnessed operating in Canada at events such as the Vancouver Olympics and the recent G8 Summit in Ontario. With summer temperatures often rising above 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit), and an elevation that begins at 3,300 feet at KAF and goes up from there for many forward operating bases (FOBs), it was obvious that dealing with extreme density altitude was going to be the major hurdle to overcome in Afghanistan.
Contrary to civilian operations, where any given machine’s basic empty weight is generally kept as low as possible, the military operates its aircraft heavy – very, very heavy. The Griffon sports a crew of four: pilot, co-pilot, flight engineer and gunner, all of whom wear body armour, pack personal firearms and ammunition, and carry emergency equipment in case they encounter trouble in the field. Add to this load armoured seats for the pilots, defensive weapons, a heads-up display and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) technology, and you have a helicopter that is already uncomfortably close to its maximum gross weight, even before fuel has been added to the equation.
After considerable high-level discussion within the Air Force, it was decided that the Griffon would be re-invented almost completely, expanding its capabilities concurrently with its refit into a capable fighting machine. The refit was necessary because, unlike many of Canada’s prior deployments, the Afghan mission is a combat mission, requiring a whole new suite of technologies.
Getting It Ready
Maj. Charles Mangliar, Griffon commander for Task Force Faucon (the Canadian Helicopter Force Afghanistan unit of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing), explained that the thought process prior to deployment was that the military had “to make the helicopter perform better, and strip off [as much] weight as possible.” Both sliding doors, some avionics, and items such as survival kits and flight manuals were removed, and nose-mounted counter weights were discarded with the addition of the armoured seats.
While the initial stated task of the Griffon was to escort the Chinooks on daily “ring route” FOB re-supply missions, or during “deliberate operations,” where troops are inserted into combat, it quickly became obvious the platform could be used for an expanded role if properly equipped. “We don’t have the luxury of many platforms like the Americans,” said Mangliar, “we have to be very flexible in our capabilities” – something civilian pilots and operators in Canada can certainly relate to.
To that end, a total re-think was in order, and several critical decisions were made. Said JTF-Afg Air Wing’s commander, Col. Paul Prévost, “For example, the [3,000-round-a-minute] M134D Dillon guns installed on the CH-146 Griffon are imparting laser-like firing precision to door gunners, which in turn improves the security of CH-147 Chinooks and their passengers. Additionally, the L-3 Wescam MX-15 was integrated to the CH-146 Griffon, resulting in a full range of electro-optics and infrared imaging capabilities to enable the detection, recognition and identification of various types of targets.”
It should be noted that the Griffon was already a highly developed aircraft platform. So, choosing which modifications to carry out was a difficult decision, as the law of diminishing returns certainly applies, with cost versus benefit always a factor, too.
Like anything involving aircraft, there was a trade-off with the increase in operational scope. “It is actually heavier than [the original Griffon] we started with,” said Mangliar, but it now has “a [greatly] increased capability.”
Heavier? Yes, with a ramp weight in the mid-8,000-pound range before fuel and crew, and a max takeoff weight (MTOW) of only 11,900 pounds (compared to the 23,500-pound [10,650-kilogram] MTOW of the United States military’s UH-60 Black Hawk), the performance of the Griffon is tested to the maximum on each flight. In fact, significant reductions in fuel loads are often required to carry out the mission, particularly in the summer months.
Crewmembers make up a considerable part of that remaining useful load, with “one guy [we had] actually weighing 410 pounds with all his kit,” said Mangliar.
Addressing the Limitations
Additional operational capabilities not withstanding, performance was still going to be a major issue for the CH-146 – an issue that senior Air Force personnel in Ottawa decided to consult with both Bell and Pratt & Whitney Canada (P&WC) on for a solution. The answer lay in the charts.
In the civilian world, performance charts and the limitations section of the flight manual are non-negotiable items. What few realize, said Mangliar, is that these charts and limitations are predicated on values that include “a safety margin” – they are not absolutes. Given the extreme conditions of the operational theatre, the Air Force asked Bell and P&WC to look into these values to see if any extra performance was available to be extracted; there was.
What they found was the charts and limitations “were not a true depiction of the Twin-Pac’s [ultimate performance],” and on the internal turbine temperature (ITT) of the engines, in particular, there was room for improvement. “This was done to mitigate high density altitudes,” said Mangliar, creating a little bit more wiggle room to allow for a few extra, critical per cent in torque on those hot summer days.
There is a method to the madness, however, and that method is the PPI, or power performance index, developed in Ottawa. The PPI measures each individual engine on a daily basis and provides an accurate depiction of its performance. “The aim is to fly the aircraft to the max of its [capabilities]” said Maj. Sebastian Cote, Task Force Faucon’s chief maintenance officer.
On the hottest days, when the engines are ITT limited (as opposed to torque-limited during the winter months or as they are normally in Canada), the crews have the ability to eke out an additional margin of power if and when needed. “They still have to be careful,” cautioned Cote, as abusing the increased limits will have long-term effects on the powerplants and incurs time penalties on all dynamic parts, such as drive shafts, rotor heads and blades. So far, though, Cote said he is “very surprised by the Griffon here, it is very robust,” and the engines are still reaching full time-before-overhaul.
The PPI system does not stop there, however. Each aircraft carries an onboard laptop where “a computerized program [is used] to figure out the exact gross weights that you can use on a given day,” explained Cote. It is a quick, highly accurate and effective method for the crews to understand their specific aircraft and its performance on a per flight basis. Inputs of ITT, torque, gross weight, pressure altitude and outside air temperature are used to derive a performance index number, and in a country where temperature and elevation are major factors on each flight, it provides pilots with a fast, clear look at where they can – and cannot – go on a given day.
Said Mangliar emphatically, “We are using this aircraft to the maximum, but we are doing it as safe[ly] as possible.”
Expanding the Mission
With the increase in operational capability of the Griffon platform, its mission has been expanded, said Mangliar: “We’re doing more [than we were in 2008], it’s not a status quo situation.”
Both the Dillon Miniguns (a Gatling-type machine gun) and the L-3 Wescam MX-15 imaging system are largely responsible for this expanded role. The Dillon allows more “rounds to get on-target very quickly and accurately,” said Mangliar. This is an increase in brute force, but one that “has zero or near-zero collateral damage,” as it is a more “surgical” weapon than the antiquated 1950s-era C6 it replaced. Now the Griffon crews can be used to defend NATO ground-troops-in-contact, where the intimidation factor of the Dillon – due to its overwhelming rate of fire, reliability and accuracy – can be extremely effective in breaking contact or eliminating immediate threats.
“Helicopters are very effective at breaking contact [between opposing ground forces in a fire fight], but that is not always the best thing” stated Mangliar. Instead of charging into a fight within seconds of a call for air support – and consequently scattering the enemy – crews have learned through experience that sometimes it is better to stand off and use the ISR capability to assess the contact before rolling in for a target-specific strike. “If we break contact every time [there’s a fire fight], the enemy is able to fight again [later],” which is not necessarily the most desirable outcome when one is trying to eliminate a long-term threat.
Of course, the mere presence of the helicopters above a convoy is often enough to prevent attacks that otherwise may be pursued by the enemy if there was little fear of immediate reprisal. This “top cover” role – flying in circles at altitude, keeping watch – may be a little tedious from the crew’s perspective, but they know it is a valuable and appreciated one.
It is important, however, to point out that the Griffon “is not an attack platform.” Stressed Mangliar, “We don’t do the job of an Apache or a Kiowa, we don’t go into the high-risk missions with the 146.” Instead, the Griffon augments the roles of the various NATO helicopter platforms, and has demonstrated its ability to fill in where other aerial assets are in short supply – an almost constant condition in Afghanistan, where rotary-wing assets are perpetually at a premium.
The Griffon is also breaking new ground for the Canadian Forces, said Mangliar, “bridging into the offensive realm,” if not going there completely. The term “battlefield armed ISR,” is what the Air Force is using to describe this new mission stance, and it is one that greatly increases the utility of the Griffon.
One of the areas where the Griffon has made a significant impact in theatre is through counter-IED (improvised explosive device) operations. IEDs have resulted in a significant number of NATO, International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Army troop casualties over the years, and have received much attention right from the beginning of the conflict in 2001. They are a constant and ever-evolving threat, and one of the reasons for the standing up of the JTF-Afg Air Wing in the first place.
The process of the CH-146 crews combating IEDs, though, has been one of “trial and error,” said Mangliar. With tactics and methods building on each success or failure, “the job is evolving and progressing” all the time.
This is where the ISR capability provided by the L-3 Wescam MX-15 imaging system has become indispensable, although it has definitely added to the pilot workload, with its operation being “a full-time job” for the aircraft commander. It is a “non-traditional” use of the ISR, but having a true standoff capability – allowing the aircraft to clearly observe a target of interest from afar, prior to engagement – has changed the game for counter-IED operations.
With an intensifying spotlight shining on Afghan civilian deaths in the war, the Canadian Forces have put a high priority on reducing collateral damage during all operations. “It is difficult [to win] hearts and minds by dropping a 2,000-pound [bomb] on a compound to [eliminate] one person,” said one Griffon pilot. The Wescam’s ISR capacity, coupled with the Dillon armament, allows a much greater degree of accuracy when taking out small, confirmed targets, often just one individual or vehicle. This war is being fought in small engagements, and the tactics, hardware and methods have come to reflect that reality.
Training and Maintenance
The mission in Afghanistan is one that has presented an almost limitless procession of challenges for the Canadian Forces to overcome: on the ground and in the air, but also from a logistical standpoint and certainly from a maintenance perspective. Complex machinery fighting a complex fight in an extremely harsh environment requires preparation and attention to detail by flight crews and ground personnel alike.
Prior to deployment, flight crews underwent specialized training for their new role. And, while most military training is “supposed to be incremental and progressive,” said Mangliar, “the reality is it got mixed up and adapted to [such] a tight time frame.”
The deployment of the JTF-Afg Air Wing is somewhat unique for the Canadian Forces. In addition to personnel having been drawn from a variety of units across the country, crews were put together on short notice and the training was completed on a tight schedule, as people were made available.
Mission-specific flight training took place in the Mojave Desert at Fort Irwin, Calif., where the Chinook escort role was introduced and practiced, and the ever-present danger of “dustball” landings was addressed with both day and night training (see p.14, Vertical 911, Spring 2010). The landscape in Afghanistan is one of sand, rock and dust – a lot of dust – and it demands a pilot’s respect.
Much like the “snowballs” so familiar to pilots during winters in Canada and the northern United States, the “dustball” is a situation that presents a number of challenges to visibility and situational awareness. “Dustball” training is one of the currency requirements all pilots must keep up in theatre, and the crews take it seriously.
The dust also presents a hazard to more than just visibility. Cote remarked that from a maintenance perspective the dust requires them “to pay more attention to the [areas] where dust and sand accumulate.” He then added that they “don’t overlook or defer things here, [if we] do, we risk cancelling missions.” It is a constant battle to combat the effects of the dust in the electrical system, moving parts and particularly the engines, all the while keeping the aircraft serviceable.
While the power performance index allows additional power to be used, and the engines are still lasting through their lifecycles, the biggest issue is degradation through dust and particulate ingestion. Cote said the powerplants are rotated back to Canada at about the 3,500-hour mark, about when there starts to be a noticeable reduction in performance. A side benefit of the PPI is having a constant and accurate powerplant trending, which helps maintenance personnel keep tabs on the state of each unit.
What also helps is that “Co-operation between pilots and engineers has never been better,” said Cote. In any difficult operational environment, it takes good communication and co-operation between maintenance personnel and flight crews to get the job done safely and efficiently, and with respect for the equipment. That harmony is in evidence everywhere you look in Task Force Faucon.
Proving its worth
The Griffons, much like the men and women who fly and take care of them, have come a long way since the green light was given to their deployment to Afghanistan in 2008. The evolution of the platform itself, the tactics and methods employed, and of course the experience of the crews operating and maintaining them, has shown, truly, that where there is a will, there is a way.
By overcoming some inherent issues with the Griffon and adapting to a unique and difficult operating environment, the Canadian Air Force has been able to establish a valuable asset in its arsenal – one that proves its worth every day in Kandahar Province.