In January 2023, I wrote a guest column for Vertical about the use of regulatory exemptions related to the introduction of non-type certified helicopters for commercial use in Canada. Since then, their presence in the country and use for regular commercial operation has only increased — but my questions and concerns remain.
Whatever motives are driving the users of these aircraft, the pressure from some parts of the industry to exempt, waive, bend and ignore existing standards and regulations has been intense.
Transport Canada finally took action in May 2024, issuing Civil Aviation Safety Alert CASA 2024-06. This stopped the issuance of any further certificates of airworthiness — limited for commercial aerial work for these aircraft. But this was only after it had issued such certificates to four ex-U.S. Army Sikorsky UH-60s and an eclectic assortment of other types — some registered privately, and some commercially. Now, pressure is mounting to import more of these helicopters and remove the restrictions placed on those already in Canada.
In addition to the four UH-60s currently in Canada on the Civil Aircraft Register, some of the notable types causing double-takes include:
- Three ex-German military Dornier/Bell UH-1Ds with special certificates of airworthiness – limited, privately registered at this time.
- An ex-U.S. military Bell UH-1E with a special certificate of airworthiness – ex-military, registered commercially.
- Two ex-Canadian military Sikorsky/United Aircraft of Canada CHSS-2/CH-124 Sea Kings with special certificates of airworthiness – limited, registered privately. They are undergoing a very long, thorough and expensive process aimed at eventual commercial operation.
It is interesting to note that in the U.S., ex-Dutch military Boeing CH-47s and ex-Italian military Agusta/Sikorsky HH-3Fs (S-61R) are in-country and the subject of efforts to bypass Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 21.25 special airworthiness – restricted category requirements (specifically, the requirement for the subject aircraft to have been operated by, and in the care and custody of, a branch of the U.S. armed forces) for the purpose of commercial flight operations — or, failing that, possible parting out into the civil marketplace.
Terminology is important
Leaving aside private and government operation of ex-military helicopters, the commercial operation of ex-military helicopters in both the U.S. and Canada goes back at least 65 years. However, not all ex-military helicopters are non-type certified helicopters — many have received normal, transport or restricted category type certificates. It is also important not to confuse certificates of airworthiness with type certificates, and be aware that the definition and application of type certificate categories are quite different between the U.S. and Canada.
To illustrate how nuanced this can be, the Canadian military Bell 412/CH-146 Griffon helicopter fleet was acquired as Transport Canada type certified helicopters — so can be relatively easily returned to full civil operation at the end of their military service life. This example is quite unique, as the Canadian government’s procurement personnel at the time understood the value to the Canadian taxpayer of having an asset maintain its residual value at the end of its service life. Previously, disposal of ex-Canadian military helicopters realized limited financial return as a direct result of the helicopters not being easily certifiable for unrestricted civil use.
Helicopter types that have received type certification in any category in either country are of much less concern than those that haven’t. This is because type certified helicopters have been subjected to legally approved and well documented development and production processes that have been scrutinized by a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) like the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or Transport Canada before the issuance of their type certificate.
This means that helicopters receiving a certificate of airworthiness stating compliance with that type certificate (no matter the category) must comply with the extensive requirements of that type certificate (i.e. the helicopter does NOT require exemptions from any FAR or CAR requirements like the recent non-type certified Canadian-registered UH-60s do).
Type certificates in categories other than “normal” or “transport” are usually subject to many limitations commensurate with their failure to meet various “standard” certification requirements. Also, and very importantly, because there is a type certificate holder behind each type certificate, all those complicated and expensive continuing airworthiness responsibilities now have a person or entity accountable to a CAA for their creation and upkeep. This includes things like technical manuals, flight manuals, service bulletins, maintenance programs, time between overhaul (TBO) and finite life changes, product liability and much more.
Helicopters built without a type certificate obviously do not have a type certificate holder in the background. Nobody is responsible to a CAA for those elements I’ve listed above. This should give pause to anyone remotely familiar with the operation and maintenance of helicopters.
Military versus civil helicopters
The major fleets of military helicopters in the U.S. and Canada (Canada’s Bell 412/CH-146 fleet excepted) have been built in response to government-tendered contracts. The aircraft are built to exacting specifications described in those contracts, which reflect the military’s specific needs at that time (for air medical, armed combat, submarine detection, or troop movement, for example).
The resulting batches of helicopters may look the same, but they are not the same — they have been tailored to comply with each contract. And while they may resemble civil type certified helicopters, they most certainly have not been designed, built or operated in compliance with a civil type certification process. This is why there is no type certificate number recorded on the aircraft data plate — only a government contract number.
That contract is a highly guarded agreement between the manufacturer and the government. In recent conversation with a major U.S. helicopter manufacturer, a request to see an example of one of these contracts was denied. It was also confirmed that, although different variations of a prolifically produced U.S. military helicopter appear to be similar, the air medical, troop, marine and armed combat versions were built under different contracts to very different standards and, critically, different service life expectations. The air medical versions were designed and built for longer service life than troop versions, and armed combat versions were designed and built for a significantly lower service life than all other versions.
Helicopters built without type certification do not have a basis on which to establish the risk assessment required in the type certification process. In civil regulatory terms, they are effectively baseless. There is nothing to review, nothing to build from, nothing to use in the required risk assessment other than noting that they may “fly well.”
Questions, questions, questions
Many of the issues I raised in 2023 remain — and a few others have raised their heads over the last two years.
Firstly: How, why and by whom was the decision made to apply CAR 507.03(5) special certificate of airworthiness – limited for these purposes in the first place? As both a Canadian citizen and a dedicated retired 25-year Transport Canada airworthiness inspector, the potential ramifications of this really concern me.
If there is no type certificate for either an aircraft or engine, how does the FAA or Transport Canada manage airworthiness directives against them?
Because of the number of exemptions required in Canada to get a non-type certified helicopter into the air, especially for commercial purposes, has anyone really thought through all the flight and maintenance-oriented CAR requirements that have lost whatever clarity they had previously (such as personnel licensing, training, technical records, modifications, traceability of parts, modification approval, and so on)?
The extent of unanswered questions, along with creative thinking, rapid policy changes, and operator demands related to non-type certified helicopters, seems unbounded.
Recent events
Portrayal of recent Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) border-related UH-60 flight operation is short on underlying legal detail. The helicopters involved are non-type certified; registered and operated commercially under an air operator certificate; and are being flown and maintained by the operator’s pilots and aircraft maintenance engineers. The legality of their much-publicized night vision imaging systems (NVIS), fast rope and hoisting activities (and necessary aircraft modifications) doesn’t appear to have been questioned.
Additional commercial UH-60s for the RCMP, this time U.S.-registered, may soon join the Canadian-registered UH-60s. This would not be the first time U.S.-registered ex-military UH-60s (and other types) have operated in Canada under the auspices of NAFTA (now CUSMA) for aerial work such as logging, firefighting and film production work. But NAFTA/CUSMA guidance material, like FAA AC 00-60B for example, is crystal clear.
“Aircraft must have an original FAA or TCCA civil type certificate for all SAS (specialty air service) operations. Ex-military aircraft that have restricted-category certification based on military experience only are not eligible, while ex-military aircraft that are operating as civil types may be eligible, provided they meet civil standards and are in a civil type configuration.”
Some of these helicopters are being permitted to carry passengers, representing a significant (and quiet) relaxation of legal hard operating restrictions applied to such helicopters in both the U.S. and Canada. I wonder if crew members, law enforcement passengers, and any others who are asked to be passengers (or forced by virtue of arrest or detention) will have reviewed their life insurance policies for clauses specifically excluding coverage for death resulting from flight in uncertified aircraft — as the fine print in my own family’s policies state.
These aircraft also all have hard limitations, requiring large, highly visible placards stating in part:
”…this aircraft does not comply with internationally recognized standards and passengers fly in this aircraft at their own risk…”
In addition, those same hard limitations require that before EACH AND EVERY flight, passengers must be briefed on the meaning AND implications of the placard.
Provincial government wildfire fighting organizations have begun making arrangements to use contracted UH-60s for the 2025 fire season. Some of these contracts are to include NVG/NVIS firefighting operations. The very few Canadian civil helicopter operators who have achieved approval for NVG/NVIS operations (for air ambulance, ship pilot transfer, or firefighting) have all done so using type-certified helicopters after incurring the cost of millions of dollars and years in the approval process. It is hard to understand how recently registered non-type certified UH-60 NVG/NVIS operations for border patrol and firefighting could receive the same approval quicker through any other process.
All of this serves to make for a very confusing situation. In what is supposed to be one of the most highly monitored and regulated industries in Canada, does anyone really have a clear overall understanding of all this? Or even the kernel of a plan for moving forward?
A Request
The following is particularly addressed to those who have been emphatically articulating the history, quality and urgent usefulness of these non-type certified helicopters.
If we are to replace our well designed and long serving civil aircraft certification, maintenance and flight operation requirements with a system of strongly held opinions and eloquent arguments about non-type certified helicopters being (pick one or all of the following) proven, strong, robust, well-built, useful, effective, necessary, solid, rugged, or reliable, while still being non-compliant with basic foundational and internationally agreed upon civil aviation standards, shouldn’t we do so equitably with due consideration, public notification, consultation, planning and careful implementation? It would seem to make more sense than to issue a continuing series of ad-hoc exemptions with the inevitable loss of linkage to all the underlying regulations, standards and guidance. It is becoming literally impossible to know and understand what the applicable current civil aviation safety requirements are in many situations.
I feel it necessary to add that, in the case of Sikorsky-built UH-60s, for example, all the above adjectives (and more) are very likely true. These are great helicopters and could serve us well — AFTER we have established a way to respect at least the intent of (if not compliance with) all those pesky certification, maintenance and flight operation regulations and standards. The ones that have been written with the blood of those who came before that led us to where we are today.
Given the ever-expanding commercial privileges accorded to those operating non-type certified helicopters, it is surprising that there isn’t a long lineup of others using the now-established precedence to demand similar “rights.”
As the number of non-type certified helicopters in the marketplace increases, it reduces the incentive for manufacturers to invest in expensive type certification of certain future helicopter projects. The long-term ramifications of this bear thinking about.
To be clear, I have absolutely no economic interest in the matter — including receiving no remuneration for writing this. I only wish to ensure that all those inside and outside the helicopter industry impacted by these significant changes are informed — and hopefully consulted.
Editor’s Note: Brent Wallace is a retired Transport Canada Civil Aviation Safety Inspector – Airworthiness
Excellent editorial. Several points demonstrate Transport Canada has lost control of basic safety principles and standards. Operating successfully for a time does not mean operations were safe. One could call these “Lucky Ops”, and Transport Canada appears to be without defence. I am surprised that Underwriters have stepped up to cover these operations. Sadly this big hole in the regulatory safety net is not likely to be tested/confirmed until some one is seriously injured or loses their life, and plaintiff’s lawyers embarrass the poor staff members that were told these aircraft are just as good. Like condition monitoring of critical parts, let’s hope maintenance personnel can identify eminent failures and luck is on one’s side when airborne.
Well said……..