Calling it “shameful” and “not right,” National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) chair Jennifer Homendy held a highly unusual press conference Dec. 10 to angrily denounce an obscure section of the $900 billion U.S. federal National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that would effectively eliminate safety guard rails put in place following the fatal mid-air collision of a military helicopter and passenger airliner near Washington Reagan National Airport in January.
The collision, between a U.S. Army Sikorsky UH-60L Black Hawk on a night-time night vision goggle training mission and a Mitsubishi regional jet (American Eagle flight 5342), occurred off the approach end of Runway 33 at Washington Reagan National Airport (DCA), and killed all three soldiers on the helicopter and 64 passengers and crew on the commuter airliner.
Homendy called the provisions, “a significant safety setback” and “an unacceptable risk to the flying public, to commercial and military aircraft crews, and to the residents of the region” by “inviting history to repeat itself by recreating the same conditions that were in place on Jan. 29.”
Following the accident, the FAA permanently closed Helicopter Route 4 on March 14 — the route the accident helicopter was flying that slices through the short approach to DCA Runway 33. In June, it announced that the boundaries of the remaining helicopter route zones were reduced in size to move them farther away from DCA.
According to the NTSB, in a letter sent Dec. 10 to the leadership of the U.S. House and Senate Armed Services Committee, Section 373 of the NDAA “allows the secretary of any military department to operate training missions in the DCA airspace in a manner that already existed prior to the midair collision on Jan. 29.”
And while Section 373 would add a new requirement for military aircraft operating in the DC airspace to broadcast ADS-B Out and have TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System)-compatible warning systems, these provision can be waived by anyone down to flag officers if they determine it to be in “the national interest” and if a risk assessment has been completed by the Department of War (DoW).
Military aircraft in the U.S. are currently not required to be equipped with ADS-B Out. The accident helicopter was not using it. The NTSB notes that TCAS has minimal effectiveness below 900 feet agl and often provides insufficient time for deconfliction during low altitude operations. TCAS did alert on the accident airliner, but with insufficient time for the pilots to react, according to Homendy.
She also expressed skepticism that the military had the capability to perform civilian airspace risk assessments.
“We have serious concerns that such a risk assessment would not adequately evaluate the safety of the airspace, as it is clear from our investigation thus far, that the Army and potentially other military departments within the DoW do not know understand the complexities of the DC airspace, how to conduct a thorough safety risk assessment, or implement appropriate mitigations to ensure safety for all.
“Concurrence by the Secretary of Transportation does not alleviate these concerns. In fact, the language seems to allow military departments to do what they want in the DC airspace, with very little input from the Secretary and none from the FAA, aviation industry, and others impacted.”
Homendy blasted both the House and Senate committees for failing to consult with the NTSB prior to drafting the provisions. “At no point was the NTSB ever consulted on this language,” she said — even though the NTSB briefed both committees on its related safety recommendations after the accident.
The perceived safety loopholes contained in Section 373 drew immediate criticism from a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators, including Tammy Duckworth (D-Illinois), a former Army Black Hawk pilot and the ranking member of the Senate Aviation Subcommittee.
In a joint bipartisan statement issued with Senators Cruz, Cantwell, and Moran, Duckworth said Section 373, “Protects the status quo, allowing military aircraft to keep flying in DC airspace under different rules and with outdated transmission requirements.”
Families of Flight 5342 victims also expressed opposition, including the parents of first officer Sam Lilley. Tim and Sheri Lilley said, “The national security waivers that have been abused by operators in the DC area are problematic and subject to abuse. This bill addresses that with a ‘window dressing’ fix that will continue to allow for the setting aside of requirements with nothing more than a cursory risk assessment.”
Victims’ families have filed a plethora of related lawsuits and damages could potentially run into hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars.
Yesterday, the U.S. House passed the NDAA, 312-112. Senate approval is expected next week.
On July 29, 2025, nine members of the U.S. Senate introduced legislation to mandate both ADS-B Out and ADS-B In in controlled airspace (S.2503, The Rotorcraft Operations Transparency and Oversight Reform Act). It would also require all aircraft to have ADS-B by 2031. The bill advanced out of the Senate Commerce Committee in October is expected to gain remaining required legislative approvals late this year or early next.
